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Introduction
Post-2010, the credibility of mainstream Arab news outlets has overall diminished. Pan-
Arab satellite channels, previously celebrated for their relatively balanced reporting, have 
experienced considerable dips in viewership in light of accusations of inciting violence 
along sectarian and/or partisan lines. Audience user trends have diversified, with viewers 
now seeking to verify news through a range of sources.1 Media outlets are nonetheless 
capable of rapid reformulation, and shifts in media consumption do not negate the 
ongoing role of the traditional media in influencing Arab public opinion across the region. 
With this in mind, a better understanding of whether and how mainstream Arabic lan-
guage news providers have incited sectarian violence in their coverage of domestic 
conflicts in the Middle East can have practical implications for policymakers. In a main-
stream context, claims of sectarian incitement are frequently politically charged, and, as 
this research shows, in conflict situations it is often difficult to pinpoint the difference 
between reporting bias – which affects news media globally – and promulgating violence. 
This report takes five seminally violent events during the wars in Iraq and Syria post-
2010 which are widely perceived to have a ‘sectarian’ dimension, and deconstructs how 
pan-Arab satellite news channels presented those events through accumulative coverage. 
Coverage is predominantly drawn from the most popular channels: Al-Jazeera Arabic and 
Al-Arabiya as well as a relative newcomer, Al-Mayadeen.2 Each claims to provide objective 
journalism, notwithstanding their financial sponsorship from elites close to the govern-
ments of Qatar, Saudi Arabia and (probably) Iran, respectively. The rationale for choosing 
these channels is not to single them out as uniquely culpable but is based on their pop-
ularity; the quality of their digital archives; the evidence that their financial patrons have 
been heavily vested in the outcomes of particular regional conflicts; and the fact that 
several Arab states have banned Al-Jazeera on the basis that it incites sectarian violence 
and/or Islamist extremist militancy. While the report does not focus on Al-Jazeera English, 
which has an appreciably different editorial line from its Arabic language counterpart, 
where information is scarce, it does cross-reference reporting by the target channels with 
Al-Jazeera English as well as BBC Arabic.
1   ‘Media Industries in the Middle East, 2016’, Northwestern University in Qatar, 2016. Available at: 
http://www.mideastmedia.org/industry/2016/
2   Survey information on viewership figures post-2010 is scarce and viewers are presumably reticent 
to admit to watching channels online in countries where they are banned from broadcasting. 
Overall, viewership of Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya is thought to have dropped considerably, but 
still numbers in the tens of millions. In 2000, Al-Jazeera claimed an estimated 50 million regular 
viewers. By 2013, Al-Jazeera cited combined polling by IPSOS and SIGMA to claim 23 million regional 
viewers. ‘Researchers confirm Al Jazeera viewership’, Al-Jazeera Press Office, 2013. Available at: 
https://www.aljazeera.com/pressoffice/2013/06/201364181423546953.html; in 2014, Al-Arabiya claimed 
to have a ‘social footprint’ of 27 million. See Ben Flanigan, ‘MBC’s Sheikh Waleed al-Ibrahim goes all 
out at Arab Media Forum’, Al-Arabiya, 21 May 2014. Available at: https://english.alarabiya.net/en/media/
television-and-radio/2014/05/21/MBC-s-Sheikh-Waleed-goes-all-out-at-media-forum-.html; Al-Mayadeen 
has not published public polling on viewership but had over 7. 2 million Facebook ‘likes’, as of March 2019. 
Available at: https://www.facebook.com/almayadeen/
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Based on the case studies, the report finds empirical grounds for believing that all of the 
channels in question have, to varying degrees, served to incite violence. Overwhelmingly, 
however, incitement to sectarian violence has been a by-product of political partisanship, 
not a calculated objective. With a few notable exceptions, the channels have avoided 
manifestly abusive hate speech against particular individuals or groups. However, they 
have all promoted dangerous speech (i.e. speech, text, or images that can increase the 
risk that its audience will condone or participate in violence against members of another 
group – in this case, sect) in various contextually determined ways.3 Most notably, they 
have enhanced sect group victimhood narratives and increased security dilemmas pre-
mised on sectarian identity.
The report seeks to highlight prominent tropes of pan-Arab conflict media, but the 
objective is not to assert any particular normative claims about the legitimacy of some 
manifestations of violence over others. Rather it is to better understand how discursive 
processes in the mainstream media can ‘sectarianise’ audiences and to present policy-
makers with evidence that may inform decisions on how to engage with such media. 
The first part of the paper introduces the concepts of hate speech and incitement to vio-
lence, and their manifestations in fringe and mainstream Arab media. It goes on to assess 
the intertwined political and religious worldviews of the channels in question. The second 
part outlines the methodological approach and the five empirical case studies of events 
in the Iraqi and Syrian conflicts, and draws out linguistic and thematic tropes of bias that 
emerge from the channels’ coverage of those events. The conclusion highlights policy-rel-
evant assessments on engagement with the Arab media emerging from the analysis. 
Politics, Religion and Incitement in the Arab Media
Hate Speech and Incitement to Violence 
Hate speech and incitement to violence are closely related but distinct concepts. Many 
countries have laws against expressions of hatred premised on particular immutable char-
acteristics of an individual or group, including ethnicity, nationality, religion, gender or 
sexual orientation. Article 20 of the UN’s International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights states that ‘any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law’. And the 
Ethical Journalism Network (EJN) has formulated guidelines to help journalists to identity 
and avoid promoting hate speech.4 There is, however, no universally accepted definition 
of hate speech, and many argue that it is inherently subjective, often undetectable to all 
but the victims, and as such, impossible to define.
3   For a full explanation of dangerous speech, see ‘The Dangerous Speech Project’. Available at:  
https://dangerousspeech.org/the-dangerous-speech-project-preventing-mass-violence/
4  See ‘5 Point Test for Hate Speech’, Ethical Journalism Network. Available at:  
https://ethicaljournalismnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/EJN-5-point-test-for-hate-speech-English-1.pdf
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Here, a minimalist understanding of ‘manifest hate speech’ is used to refer to overtly offen-
sive language that vilifies individuals or groups on the basis of their sect or that openly 
calls for violence against them. In this context, a recognised lexicon of terms used to refer 
abusively to Shiʿa and Sunnis respectively has emerged. These include phrases used by 
Shiʿa militants to refer pejoratively to Sunnis (Nawasib) and to salafi-jihadists (Takfiriyyin 
– those who pronounce others to be unbelievers, sometimes rendered in an Anglicised 
fashion as ‘Takfiris’) and by Sunni salafi-jihadists to refer to Shiʿa (such as Rawafid and 
Nusayriyyin); to Iranians (such as Majus and Safawiyyin); and to Hezbollah (Hizb al-Shay-
tan and Hizb al-Lat). Salafi-jihadists also refer to those whom they hold to be ‘unbelievers’ 
and thus deserving of death in offensive terms including pigs, dogs, apostates, infidels and 
polytheists.5 
Incitement to violence is frequently included in definitions of hate speech. Like hate 
speech, its definition is also problematic. In this report, however, it is used to encompass 
a range of techniques or tropes that are not necessarily overtly abusive and may include 
contextually situated inferences, selective use of information, emphasis of victimhood 
narratives, and provocative use of imagery that glorifies violence. 
Over the past few decades, and in light of the sectarian dimensions to much of the vio-
lence in Iraq, Syria, Bahrain and Lebanon, fringe but also mainstream Arab media outlets 
have faced widespread criticism for inciting violence along sectarian lines.6 Several new or 
previously quietist privately owned religious channels have undergone ‘speedy politicisa-
tion.’7 Presenters on religious channels such as the British broadcast Iraqi Shiʿa channel 
Fadak, the Saudi Sunni Wesal, and the Egyptian Al-Nas and Al-Rahma, have regularly used 
incendiary and hateful rhetoric against other sects. By and large, however, the latter do not 
appeal to the majority of the Arab public. 
Charges levied against satellite news channels are of greater consequence considering their 
mainstream appeal – which until recently was not dictated by nationality or sect. Several 
publicised instances of Al-Jazeera presenters using hate speech and/or giving a platform to 
manifestly sectarian views have particularly fed these accusations.8 Most prominent was 
5   See Aaron Zelin & Phillip Smyth, ‘The vocabulary of sectarianism’, Foreign Policy 29 (2014). 
6  See, for instance, Waleed Zahra, ‘Ini Akrahek: Khitāb al-Karahiya wa-l-Taʾifiyya fi’l-Rabiʿa al-ʿArabi’ (‘I 
Hate You: Hate Speech and Sectarianism in the Arab Spring’), Centre for Defending Freedom of Journalists, 
2014; Magda Abu Fadil, ‘Arab Media Targets Hate Speech’, Huffington Post, 15 November 2014. Available at: 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/magda-abufadil/beirut-seminar-targets-ar_b_6163680.html; BBC Arabic 
documentary ‘Athir al-Karahiya. ʿAn Al-Taḥrid al-Madhhabi fi-l-Qanawāt al-ʿArabiyya’ (‘Provoking Hate: 
Sectarian Incitement on Arab Channels’). Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n_NKgXGcxX8
7  Khaled Hroub, Religious Broadcasting in the Middle East (London: Hurst Publishers, 2012), p. 283.
8   In 2013, Al-Jazeera ran a series of interviews by Tayser Alluni with militant Syrian rebel leaders 
including the leaders of Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam and Jabhat al-Nusra who had publicly invoked 
sectarian violence in other forums. Al-Jazeera aired further interviews with Jabhat al-Nusra’s leader in 
2015 and 2016. Available at:  
https://www.aljazeera.net/programs/today-interview/2013/6/21/6ج-ةحلسملا-ةضراعملا-زومر-ةلسلس-شولع-نارهز ; 
https://www.aljazeera.net/programs/today-interview/2013/6/11/1ج-ةحلسملا-ةضراعملا-زومر-ةلسلس-دوبع-ناسح; 
https://www.aljazeera.net/programs/specialinterview/2016/9/17/دسلأا-ماظن-عم-ناتئطاوتم-ايسورو-اكريمأ-ينلاوجلا
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an episode of the Al-Jazeera flagship show ‘al-Itijah al-Muʿakis’ in May 2015, in which the 
moderator, Faysal Al-Qassem, asked – only questionably rhetorically – whether Alawites 
had invited genocide upon themselves in Syria.9 Moreover, post-2010, several Al-Jazeera 
correspondents have used sectarian hate speech in a supposedly private capacity on social 
media.10 These examples are of course significant. However, the premise of this paper is 
that incitement to violence is primarily achieved not through use of manifest hate speech 
but through accumulative emotionally charged reporting, and is therefore more meaning-
fully understood in terms of the channels’ broader framing of events.
The Politics of Arab Satellite News Channels
Prior to the Arab uprisings, the leading pan-Arab satellite news channels, Al-Jazeera Arabic 
and Al-Arabiya, benefited from a relative lack of state control over their content when 
compared with terrestrial news channels. Like the majority of Arab news outlets, both are 
funded by politically-aligned individuals or elites. Al-Jazeera was launched in Doha in 1996 
with funding from the Emir of Qatar, while Al-Arabiya was launched in Dubai in 2003 by 
the Middle East Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) under the ownership of Walid al-Ibrahim, 
a Saudi businessman and brother-in law to the late King Fahd. 
While the channels avoided criticism of Qatari and Saudi politics respectively, they had 
leeway to address thorny regional political issues. Al-Jazeera in particular took advantage 
by ‘giving a voice to the voiceless’, frequently at the expense of establishment authority. 
This encouraged a view that pan-Arab channels could create a public sphere in which 
individuals could freely discuss societal problems and thereby influence political action.11 
Al-Arabiya’s editorial line has always been more muted; in 2008 its director told the New 
York Times that it was established ‘to cure Arab television of its penchant for radical poli-
tics and violence.’12 Nonetheless, both channels provided relatively balanced coverage of 
regional events. 
Following the Arab uprisings, both Doha and Riyadh adopted more aggressively interven-
tionist foreign policies, and the channels became more obvious tools of those policies. In 
2012, a group of former Al-Jazeera Arabic staff launched Al-Mayadeen in Beirut, citing disil-
lusionment with Al-Jazeera’s ‘unbalanced coverage’ of the Syrian conflict as their principle 
9   ‘al-Itijah al-Muʿakis’, Al-Jazeera, 5 May 2015. Available at:  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vieBO7BsZM8
10   In June 2014, for instance, after the Iraqi army fled ISIL militants in Mosul and the government sought 
US air support, the Al-Jazeera Arabic Iraqi affairs editor, Hamed Hadid, tweeted ‘After their rats flee Sunni 
attacks, Safavids rush to their Crusader Masters to strike the Mujahidin’.
11   Mark Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, Al-Jazeera, and Middle East Politics Today (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2006); Mohammed El-Nawawy & Leo Gher, ‘Al Jazeera: Bridging the East-
West Gap through Public Discourse and Media Diplomacy’, Journal of Transnational Broadcasting Studies 
10: 2 (2003); Mohamed Zayani, ‘Arab satellite television and politics in the Middle East’ (Georgetown 
Digital Repository, 2004). 
12   Robert Worth, ‘A Voice of Moderation Helps Transform Arab Media’, New York Times, 4 January 2008.
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reason for splitting.13 Al-Mayadeen quickly became associated with a pro-Iranian, pro-Hez-
bollah and pro-Assad position. It has never officially revealed its funding sources, but is 
mooted to be backed by Iranian money, and its editorial line has broadly corresponded to 
Tehran’s foreign policy.14
Geopolitical objectives have prompted Qatar and Saudi Arabia to financially support 
militant Sunni groups espousing sectarian violence against Shiʿa and/or other religious 
minorities.15 Meanwhile, Iran, often acting through Hezbollah, has trained, funded, and 
fought alongside Shiʿa militant groups in Iraq and Syria.16 However, none of the patrons 
has exclusively backed groups espousing sectarian violence. Qatar has broadly promoted 
the Muslim Brotherhood across the region, which in most of its iterations accepts reli-
gious pluralism; Saudi Arabia, fashioning itself as the regional leader of the ‘moderates’ 
has attempted to back secular and/or tribal factions in Syria and Iraq; and Iran has forged 
alliances with minorities in different parts of the region including Kurds and Christians, 
as well as attempting to continue patronage of Sunni Palestinian resistance groups. The 
channels’ worldviews have thus encompassed various political positions and are subject 
to change. Indeed, post-2017, transnational sectarian rhetoric has arguably receded in 
keeping with changing geo-political priorities.17
Since June 2017, Al-Jazeera has been at the centre of a diplomatic crisis between Qatar and 
Saudi Arabia and its regional allies.18 Citing Qatar’s regional sponsorship of terrorism, the 
Saudi-led bloc demanded that Qatar comply with thirteen demands, including severing 
all ties to ‘terrorist’ organisations, specifically the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic State 
in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Al-Qaeda, and Hezbollah; and closing Al-Jazeera and its 
affiliate stations.19 Qatar’s rejection of the ultimatum led to an ongoing regional diplo-
matic and trade blockade on it and bans on watching Al-Jazeera in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, 
Bahrain and Egypt. Iraq and Syria had already revoked the operating licences of Al-Jazeera; 
Syria has also banned Al-Arabiya from operating, and the Egyptian-owned Nilesat and 
Saudi-controlled Arabsat satellite companies have both banned Al-Mayadeen, forcing it 
to rely on its digital platforms. Added to this, in November 2017, Waleed al-Ibrahim was 
detained for several months on the orders of the Saudi Crown Prince on allegations of 
corruption. On his release in January, he signed majority control of MBC over to the Saudi 
government’s investment fund, increasing official state control over Al-Arabiya.20
13   Zeina Karam, ‘New Pan-Arab Satellite Channel Goes on Air’, Associated Press, 6 November 2012.
14  Al-Mayadeen’s publicly available company records list only Ghassan Ben Jiddo (former head of 
Al-Jazeera’s Tehran bureau), his son, and his wife, Nada Ghaemmaghami al-Najafi, who is Iranian, as 
shareholders. Available at: http://cr.justice.gov.lb/search/result.aspx?id=1000110090
15  Chris Phillips, ‘Gulf Actors and the Syria Crisis’, in Philips et al., The New Politics of Intervention of Gulf 
Arab States (London: LSE Middle East Centre Collected Papers, Volume 1, 2015), pp. 41-51.
16  Brian Katz, ‘Axis Rising: Iran’s Evolving Regional Strategy and Non-State Partnerships in the Middle 
East’, CSIS Briefs (2018). Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/axis-rising-irans-evolving-regional-
strategy-and-non-state-partnerships-middle-east
17  Hassan Hassan, ‘The Eclipse of Sectarianism’, The Atlantic, 2018. Available at:  
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/end-sectarian-violence-middle-east/573580/
18   Gregg Carlstrom, ‘What’s the Problem with Al-Jazeera?’, The Atlantic, 24 June 2017.
19   ‘The 13 demands on Qatar from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt’, The National, 23 June 2017.
20  Jamal Khashoggi, ‘Saudi Arabia’s crown prince already controlled the nation’s media. Now he’s 
squeezing it even further’, Washington Post, 7 February 2018.
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The hyper-politicisation of Arab satellite news has injected additional political dimen-
sions into claims that any given channel is promoting ‘sectarian violence’. In some cases 
there are, however, solid grounds for such accusations.
Religious Brand Management
Religion is infused into society and politics in the Arab world and, unsurprisingly, religious 
discourse has filtered into the content of the mainstream satellite news media.21 Although 
receptive to the views of diverse parties, Al-Jazeera Arabic has always been associated with 
pan-Islamism. Prior to the Arab uprisings, one of Al-Jazeera’s central claims to fame was 
the hugely popular ‘Al-Shariʿa wa’l-Hayat’, a weekly show normally featuring the Egyptian 
cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi. The programme dealt with themes pertaining to Islam, inviting 
viewers to call in with questions. 
Qaradawi, an ideologue for the Muslim Brotherhood, tended to promote cooperation 
between sects.22 This position was abruptly reversed in June 2013 after Hezbollah’s victory 
over rebel fighters in Qusayr, western Syria. Qaradawi denounced Hezbollah as the party 
of Satan, announced that Shiʿa were bigger infidels than Jews or Christians, and called on 
Sunnis everywhere to support the rebels in Syria. In fact, Qaradawi’s explicitly anti-Shiʿa 
views were initially aired in an Al-Arabiya interview, not during ‘Al-Shariʿa wa’l-Hayat’, but 
his image as a moderate cleric was tarnished, and the programme was axed later that year.23 
The show was not replaced, but Al-Jazeera continued to feature Islamist scholars (often 
associated with the Muslim Brotherhood) in other news and discussion programmes.
Al-Arabiya has dedicated less space to airing religious discourse and has never had a reli-
gious show parallel to ‘Al-Shariʿa wa’l-Hayat’. It has, however, interviewed and hosted 
Muslim scholars, some of whom have voiced extremist sectarian views in other forums, 
including Saudi-owned media. Since the blockade on Qatar, however, both Al-Jazeera 
Arabic and Al-Arabiya have dedicated considerable airtime to emphasising the alleged 
hypocrisy of the Saudi and Qatari state positions on Islam, respectively.24
For its part, Al-Mayadeen’s worldview embraces Islamic culture but opposes both Qatari 
and Saudi projections of Sunni Islamism.25 Al-Mayadeen’s broadcasting reflects Lebanese 
society where Hezbollah (a Shiʿa movement) is politically allied with Christian factions, 
and the Syrian conflict where the Alawite ruling elite has attempted to co-opt Christian 
21   Hroub, Religious Broadcasting in the Middle East, p. 7.
22   Mohammad Ayish, ‘Religious Broadcasting on Mainstream Channels – Al-Jazeera, MBC & Dubai’, in 
Hroub, Religious Broadcasting in the Middle East, p. 13–33.
23  ‘Sheikh Qaradawi to Al-Arabiya: Hezbollah does not represent the true Islam’. Available at: 
https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/2013/06/09/ايروس-يف-بولطم-داهجلا-ةيبرعلا-ـل-يواضرقلا-خيشلا.html
24   See, for instance, Al-Jazeera, ‘Behind the News: Did Saudi Arabia Spread Wahhabi thought to Satisfy 
the West?’ Available at:  
https://www.aljazeera.net/programs/behindthenews/2018/3/25/برغلل-ءاضرإ-يباهولا-ركفلا-ةيدوعسلا-ترشن-له/; 
and Al-Arabiya, ‘Qatar and Support for Al-Qaradawi and Hajjaj al-Ajmi terrorism’. Available at:  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fwKz4BNppW4
25   Christine Crone, ‘Producing The New Regressive Left: The Case of the Pan-Arab News TV station al- 
Mayadeen’, PhD diss., (Københavns Universitet, Det Humanistiske Fakultet, 2017); p. 76.
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minorities. In the weekly discussion show ‘Alif Lam Mim’, Algerian Sunni journalist Yahya 
Abu Zakaria addresses issues pertaining to Muslims, loudly denouncing sectarian discrim-
ination against Shiʿa, whilst simultaneously delivering fiery condemnations of Israel and 
the West. In ‘Ajras al-Mashraq’ (‘Bells of the Levant’), Maronite presenter Ghassan Shami 
discusses regional issues pertaining to Christians. The Grand Mufti of Syria, Ahmed Badr 
Ad-Din Hassoun, who is politically aligned with the Assad regime, is also a frequent guest 
on Al-Mayadeen, where he preaches abstract notions of religious tolerance.
Overall, each channel has tended to air messages of religious tolerance and moderation, 
while contributing towards knowledge production on the nature of sectarianism in the 
region through sophisticated analyses. But the abstract promotion of tolerance belies indi-
cations that it is the circumstances of particular events that elicit incitement to violence. 
Empirical Analysis
Methods
Hate speech in both traditional and social media has generated considerable research in 
recent years. Many studies identify predetermined key phrases deemed hateful in a set 
of texts and/or transcribed material. Sophisticated data analysis tools have progressively 
improved the accuracy of automated hate speech detection.26 And, in the context of incit-
ing sectarian violence between Muslims, several studies have used the terms discussed 
above – which are employed by salafi-jihadists to refer to their enemies – as the basis for 
data analysis searches. Nonetheless, quantitative approaches do not detect how hateful 
intentions or value-laden terminology emerge organically and contextually. Moreover, for 
the most part, only one particular attribute of the text or broadcast is subject to interroga-
tion, making it difficult to capture the overall context or framing of the event.
The media framing concept recognises that there are multiple ways in which to cultivate 
audience reactions, including a proclivity to violence.27 These include: 1) direct use of 
manifestly hateful language; 2) granting a frequent platform to proponents of extremist 
views (whether or not they actually promote extremist views on air); 3) repeating or sup-
pressing certain details; 4) showing imagery pointing to or denying evidence of atrocities; 
and 5) choosing language that subtly bestows or denies legitimacy to certain actions. It is 
the ensemble of these tropes that frames any given issue rather than any single trope in 
isolation. 
26  See, for instance, Tom De Smedt et al., ‘Automatic Detection of Online Jihadist Hate Speech’, 
Computational Linguistics & Pyscholinguistics Technical Report Series, CTRS-007, February 2018. Available 
at: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1803/1803.04596.pdf
27   According to Robert Entman, ‘To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them 
more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.’ Entman, 
‘Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm’, Journal of Communication 43: 4 (1993), p. 51–8. 
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Guided by the criteria above, this qualitative analysis examines how the channels framed 
five events involving inter-sect violence during the conflicts in Iraq and Syria between 
2013 and 2017, whether or not sect was in fact the determining feature of violence. From 
hundreds of events that could have been analysed, these cases were chosen because they 
represent different types of violence involving different actors at different stages of the 
conflicts in both countries, which accordingly met with quite different media responses.  
In each case, the channels’ online search engines were used to retrieve televisual and 
textual results featuring the name of the location where the event took place over a 10-day 
(or in one case, a 20-day) period. The same searches were conducted for each channel 
on YouTube and Google. The searches retrieved a combination of news articles and clips, 
programme discussions and opinion articles. The latter are included despite the websites’ 
disclaimers that they represent the author’s view alone, because they contribute to the 
collective coverage of the issue. Each entry was logged and examined using deductive 
and inductive approaches. The findings below are based on these results, with the caveat 
that it was not possible to verify what content had been removed from channel websites. 
Al-Arabiya removes content from its website after 5 years and as a result searches for the 
channel’s coverage of the Hawija violence discussed below were entirely reliant on fea-
tures retrievable through Google and YouTube.
Case Studies:
Iraq:
• Hawija, 2013: On 23 April 2013, Iraqi security forces raided a Sunni protest camp in 
the town of Hawija, Kirkuk province. Hundreds of residents had been staging a sit-
in over the preceding four months, parallel to sit-ins in other predominantly Sunni 
towns, protesting what they called the policies of exclusion and marginalisation pur-
sued by Nouri al-Maliki’s government against Sunnis. 27–50 people were killed in the 
raid, and over 70 injured (predominantly protestors). The event triggered a number 
of retaliatory killings and is broadly portrayed as signalling Iraq’s return to a state of 
sectarian conflict. Days after the raid, the Iraqi Communications and Media Commis-
sion revoked the operating licences of Al-Jazeera as well as nine other Iraqi terrestrial 
channels on the grounds that their coverage of Hawija incited sectarian violence.28
• Camp Speicher, 2014: On 12 June 2014, two days after overrunning Iraq’s second city 
Mosul, members of ISIL (hitherto identified by the Arabic acronym, ‘Daesh’) killed 
between 1,500 and 1,900 unarmed Iraqi air force cadets from Camp Speicher in Tikrit.29 
The cadets had been given a 15 day rest period and were looking for transport on the 
highway when Daesh militants in buses kidnapped them at gunpoint. Survivors testi-
fy that the perpetrators singled out Shiʿa from Sunni recruits, loaded the Shiʿa onto 
28   Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki also threatened to close Al-Arabiya in June 2014, citing its ‘biased’ 
coverage. 
29   According to the Iraqi government, former members of the Baath party were also amongst the 
perpetrators.
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trucks, took them to the desert and shot them in mass graves. While Daesh released 
a video of the killings on social media, the Ministry of Defence was unable to confirm 
the details of the victims, which only began to emerge in subsequent weeks.
• Fallujah, 2016: Between May and June 2016, Iraqi security forces battled to oust 
Daesh militants from Fallujah and regain control over the city. They were accompa-
nied by predominantly Shiʿa volunteer Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), notwith-
standing calls by international rights groups for the PMF not to be involved due to 
evidence of human rights violations committed by constituent militias against Sunni 
civilians during the liberation of Tikrit in 2015.
Syria: 
• Hatla, 2013: On 11 June 2013, Syrian rebel forces including a group from the Syrian 
branch of Al-Qa’eda, Jabhat al-Nusra, attacked Hatla in Deir al-Zour, a mixed Sunni 
and Shiʿa village. Some of the Shiʿa villagers had been fighting for the Assad regime 
and had attacked a rebel position the previous day. The rebels burned Shiʿa homes in 
Hatla and killed between 25 and 65 Shiʿa residents, including a number of unarmed 
women and children. Shortly afterwards, an unverified video was released online by 
Jabhat al-Nusra, in which militants were seen exhibiting the bodies of some of the 
male victims whilst making hateful sectarian remarks.  
• Besieged Villages of Foʿa, Kefraya, Madaya & Zabadani, April 2017: Throughout 
the war, pro-government and rebel forces have besieged predominantly Sunni and 
Shiʿa towns, respectively. In April 2017, Hezbollah and the opposition group Hayat 
Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) signed the Iran and Qatar-brokered ‘four towns agreement’. 
It entailed what international observers described as a semi-compulsory evacuation 
of thousands of pro-regime militants and civilians from the Shiʿa villages Foʿa and 
Kefraya in rebel-held Idlib, in exchange for the evacuation of rebel militants and fam-
ilies from the Sunni towns of Madaya and Zabadani north of Damascus, which were 
besieged by government forces. On 15 April, a vehicle-borne suicide bomber in the 
Rashidin district of Aleppo killed 126 and injured around 200 (Shiʿa) evacuees who 
had left Foʿa and Kefraya on buses and were waiting in transit.
Inciting Violence in the Arab Mainstream Media 15 
Table 1: Coverage of Key Events by Each Channel
Location &
Period
Number of Features Retrieved for Channels30
Al-Jazeera Arabic Al-Arabiya Al-Mayadeen
Hawija
23 April –  
2 May 2013
54  
including 7 discussion 
programmes, 16 
reports/news bulletin 
extracts & 31 stand-
alone articles
15  
incl. 9 visual reports/
news bulletin extracts 
with accompanying 
articles & 6 stand-
alone articles
20  
incl. 3 reports, 
1 discussion 
programme, 6 articles 
& 10 breaking news 
headlines
Speicher
22 August –  
10 September 2014
5  
all stand-alone articles
24  
incl. 1 report, 2 articles 
with video footage, 5 
opinion articles & 16 
stand-alone articles
12  
incl.5 news clips/
reports, 4 stand-alone 
articles & 3 headlines 
Fallujah
26 May –  
4 June 2016  
(latter stages of the 
battle in West Mosul)
98  
incl. 8 programmes, 32 
reports with articles & 
58 stand-alone articles
57  
incl. 19 reports/
programmes & 38 
articles, including 15 
opinion articles
30  
incl. 1 discussion 
programme, 16 news 
clips/reports with 
articles & 13 stand-
alone articles
Hatla
11–21 June 2013
1  
stand-alone article
1  
stand-alone article
3  
stand-alone articles
Foʿa, Kefraya, 
Zebadani, Madaya & 
Rashidin31
14–24 April 2017
15  
incl. 8 news reports 
and/or video footage & 
7 stand-alone articles
21  
incl. 10 news report 
clips with articles & 21 
stand-alone articles
20  
incl. 1 programme, 5 
reports, 10 headlines 
& 4 articles
Findings: Political Bias and/or Sectarian Incitement? 
Overall, the channels’ framing of the incidents reflect Qatari, Saudi and Iranian/Hezbollah 
foreign policies, respectively.
In Iraq, Iran has politically supported the government (formed through a system of sec-
tarian apportionment in which Shiʿa political groups dominate), and funds a number of 
the PMF. In Syria, Iran and Hezbollah have been the Assad government’s principle allies. 
Accordingly, in Hawija and Fallujah, Al-Mayadeen’s coverage relied largely on official 
accounts of events, giving limited coverage to dissenting views. In Fallujah, Al-Mayadeen 
had reporters embedded with the Iraqi military and the PMF and covered the operation 
30   While the number and type of results retrieved are listed, since it was impossible to verify what 
content had been removed from the websites, or whether all results were detected by the search engines, 
no attempt is made to extrapolate findings based on quantitative data.
31   Results refer to any or all of the towns in question.
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from their perspective. In Syria, Al-Mayadeen similarly had reporters embedded with 
Syrian government forces, and reported on the four towns agreement from the per-
spective of Foʿa and Kefraya residents arriving in government-held Aleppo, and Syrian 
forces entering the towns of Zebdani and Madaya after the evacuation of families and 
opposition militants.
Conversely, neither the Saudi nor Qatari government have obvious military interests in 
Iraq, though both are reputed to have cultivated political and economic relations with 
Sunni political, tribal and business figures. In covering Hawija, Al-Jazeera gave extensive air-
time to grievances by Sunni protestors in Kirkuk and Anbar against the Iraqi government. 
Al-Arabiya’s coverage of the protestors was less extensive but also broadly sympathetic. 
However, with increased Iranian involvement in Iraq in Fallujah in 2016, Al-Arabiya gave 
frequent platforms to anti-Iranian views, largely via opinion articles posted to the website. 
In Syria, Qatar is believed to have funded various opposition militant groups including 
Ahrar al-Sham, while Saudi Arabia initially funded others including Jaysh al-Islam (whose 
leader had delivered sectarian hate speeches to followers) but distanced itself from other 
sectarian extremist groups including Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra (which later 
became HTS). And, while both channels’ editorial lines were critical of the Syrian gov-
ernment and its allies, their positions on opposition groups were mixed. By the time of 
the 2017 four towns agreement signed by HTS (which controlled most of Idlib), Al-Arabi-
ya’s reporting conveyed clear hostility towards the ‘shadow state’ which had engulfed the 
opposition.
The Hatla massacre passed with little comment by any of the channels (according to the 
results retrieved). Surprisingly few Al-Mayadeen or Al-Jazeera results were retrieved about 
the Camp Speicher mass murder either. In Al-Mayadeen’s case, underreporting may reflect 
the Iraqi government’s silence on the incident; in Al-Jazeera’s case, the channel’s previous 
ambivalence on Daesh’s seizure of Mosul days before may have affected its response to 
Speicher. It is, however, also feasible that coverage was removed. All of the channels sub-
sequently described Speicher as a ‘crime’ and/or a ‘massacre’, and there was little question 
that Daesh was responsible. During the period under review, Al-Arabiya published a series 
of articles strongly condemning Daesh’s horrific crimes.32 Even so, it also discussed the 
event mostly in light of victims’ families’ anger at lack of information from the Iraqi Min-
istry of Defence, thereby deflecting blame onto the government.
Overall, evidence of the channels’ political biases vis-à-vis the events studied was far 
more apparent than evidence of sectarian incitement per se. The section below assesses 
the channels’ relative roles in promoting sectarian violence in three spheres.
32   See, for example:  
https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/iraq/2014/09/06/ةلجد-رهن-ىلع-مهثثج-وفطت-ركيابس-اياحض-.html 
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1. Broadcasting views or imagery promoting sectarian violence: Within the scope of 
the case studies, none of the channels’ presenters used manifest sectarian hate speech, 
which would constitute the clearest evidence of promoting sectarian violence.
Overall, Al-Jazeera dedicated more coverage to the views of groups calling for and/or prac-
ticing violence for whom Sunni identity was a defining feature than either Al-Mayadeen or 
Al-Arabiya. Coverage took the form of interviews, quotations, or video footage. Groups 
included the protestors in Hawija and the Sunni provinces in 2013 and members of HTS in 
the four towns agreement. Similarly, Al-Mayadeen dedicated more coverage than Al-Jazeera 
and Al-Arabiya to conveying the views of militant groups for whom Shiʿa identity was a 
defining feature – primarily the PMF in Fallujah in 2013. Al-Arabiya featured fewer inter-
views or citations with any militant group or individual espousing violence, relying more 
overall on official sources and international agencies.  
None of the individuals interviewed or cited by any channel in the results retrieved explic-
itly justified violence on a sectarian basis. But some of the groups they belong to are 
known to have promoted violence premised on sectarian sentiments in other forums, 
and viewers’ knowledge of this would inevitably affect how they understand reporting. 
In the context of Hawija, Al-Jazeera quoted the Association for Muslim Scholars (AMS) 
saying ‘Maliki and his soldiers are continuing to implement the agenda of the Wali Faqih 
[the theocratic system of government in Iran] based on ethnic and sectarian cleansing’, 
and that ‘Iraqis should realise that Maliki has declared war on them, and that he will not 
stop unless repelled.’ While this implicit call to violence is nominally directed at all Iraqis, 
to anyone familiar with the political context, it is meant specifically for Sunnis.33 AMS are 
a polemical Sunni group, previously led by Harith al-Dari. In 2006 the Iraqi government 
issued an arrest warrant for al-Dari on charges of inciting sectarian violence. In 2010, the 
US treasury designated his son Muthana a sponsor of terrorism for funding and equipping 
al-Qaeda in Iraq.34 Muthana subsequently took over the leadership of AMS and in 2016 
Al-Jazeera interviewed Muthana on the Fallujah campaign, who claimed that the oper-
ation’s goal was ‘to eradicate the resistance in Iraq in support of an Iranian–American 
project in the region.’35
Each channel used footage produced by their own cameras, opposition militant groups 
including Daesh, government agencies and citizen journalists. This included multiple 
scenes of armed fighting and rocket launches. No channel showed Jabhat al-Nusra footage 
of the Hatla killings, but Al-Arabiya did show a brief excerpt from Daesh’s footage of the 
Speicher massacre.36 During the four towns agreement, Al-Mayadeen aired a video by 
33   ‘Burial of Hawija dead amidst tension and clashes’, Al-Jazeera. Available at:  
https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2013/4/24/تاكابتشاو-رتوت-طسو-ةجيوحلا-ىلتق-عييشت
34   ‘Treasury Targets Al Qaida in Iraq’, 25 March 2010. Available at:  
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg612.aspx
35   ‘Al-Dari: the Fallujah War Aims to Eradicate the Resistance’. Available at:  
https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2016/5/29/ةمواقملا-لاصئتسلا-فدهت-ةجولفلا-برح-يراضلا; the full length 
interview with al-Dari was published soon afterwards on ‘Without Bounds’. Available at: https://www.
aljazeera.net/programs%2Fwithoutbounds%2F2016%2F6%2F19%2Fقارعلا-لبقتسم-ىلع-اهتايعادتو-ةجولفلا-برح
36   ‘Iraqi Soldier Recounts How he Escaped Speicher Massacre’. Available at: https://www.alarabiya.net/
ar/alarabiya-today/2014/09/07/ركيابس-ةرزجم-نم-هتاجن-ةصق-يوري-يقارع-يدنج.html
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‘Jannat Hoda’ entitled ‘last moments before the suicide bomber detonates amid the chil-
dren of Foʿa and Kefraya’, appearing to show the deliberate targeting of children receiving 
humanitarian supplies in Rashidin.37 All channels showed footage of dead and injured 
people in Hawija and Rashidin, but avoided close-up shots of the dead.38
2. Compounding Sectarian Narratives: Coverage of Hawija and its aftermath shows how 
the media can play into escalating sectarian rhetoric. Protesters consistently expressed 
their grievances in terms of their democratic constitutional rights as Iraqis. Similarly, their 
objections to the army’s presence in the vicinity of the protests were not premised upon 
sectarian grounds (the majority of the army is Shiʿa) but on the assertion that the army is 
an apparatus for external defence which should not be used against the citizenry.
Al-Jazeera’s reporting of Hawija and the parallel protests in the predominantly Sunni towns 
of Fallujah, Mosul, Ramadi and Suleyman Bek highlighted this framing of events, mostly 
by giving protestors extensive airtime to express their views. In one report, an Al-Jazeera 
correspondent refers to the population of Mosul staging a strike in response to the ‘rev-
olutionary appeal’, thereby casting their demands in the same light as ‘revolutionaries’ in 
other Arab Spring countries who demanded their rights from oppressive governments.39 
However, Nouri al-Maliki’s warning to Iraqis and, explicitly, to Sunni sheikhs after the raid, 
to avoid being dragged back into sectarian fitna (civil insurrection) by ‘mandassin’ (agents 
provocateurs), served to reframe the issue as one of sectarian strife between Sunnis and 
Shiʿa. Critics, including several Al-Jazeera guests, identified Maliki’s speech as a threat 
designed to secure acquiescence for the government.40 All three channels ostensibly 
rejected sectarian positions, and only rarely referred to protestors as Sunnis (tending to 
refer to them instead as tribesmen). In fact, other international media providers, including 
BBC Arabic, were more prone to ‘sect-coding’ with respect to Hawija, and Iraqi affairs in 
general, than the channels under scrutiny. BBC Arabic’s consistent identification of Iraqis 
by sect post-2004 can be seen as a simple device for the benefit of audiences who may 
be unfamiliar with the country’s political demography, but it increases the risk of sect 
becoming an overriding causal explanation. At the same time, however, following Maliki’s 
speech on Hawija, there was a marked rise in media discussion by all channels of the topic 
of sectarian violence and the nature of the presumed foreign sectarian agenda.41
37   ‘The last moments before the suicide bomber detonates amidst children of Kefraya and Foʿa’, 
Al-Mayadeen. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M4TnlN2M2Z0
38  See, for example:  
https://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2017/4/17/ديفتسملا-نع-شتف-بلحب-نيدشارلا-ريجفت
39   ‘Iraqi Forces Raid Hawija, and Civil Insurrection Continues’. Available at:  
https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2013/4/23/نايصعلا-رارمتساو-ةجيوحلا-محتقت-ةيقارع-تاوق
40  ‘Maliki warns against sectarian strife’. Available at:  
https://www.aljazeera.net/programs/behindthenews/2013/4/28/ةيفئاط-ةنتف-نم-يكلاملا-ريذحت
41   See, for example: http://www.almayadeen.net/episodes/644180/_27-04-2013; Al-Arabiya featured several 
opinion articles taken from Arab papers that manifest strong criticism of Iranian ambitions in the region. 
See, for example: https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/politics/2013/04/28/قارعلا-عابتتسا-ةصقو-ريصقلا-ةجيوحلا.html; 
and https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/politics/2013/04/25/قارعلا-ىلإ-ايروس-نم-داضملا-موجهلا.html 
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3. Selective Coverage: Sect-Based Aggressor & Victimhood Narratives: The collec-
tive coverage of each of the channels condemned sectarian violence in principle. But 
like the belligerents, the channels engaged in ‘blame games’ by consistently empha-
sising evidence or claims that political/military groups whom their financial sponsors 
opposed were victimising communities along sectarian lines. At the same time, where 
relevant, they ignored or undermined claims that groups their sponsors favoured were 
guilty of sectarian violence.
Hence, Al-Jazeera and to a lesser extent Al-Arabiya emphasised views expressed by 
Sunni protestors in Hawija, that the Shia government was deliberately excluding Sunnis 
from the political process and even subjecting them to physical abuse based on their 
sect. While the numbers killed and injured remained unclear for days, both channels 
cited sources who claimed fatalities were about twice as high as the MoD figure of 27.42 
Al-Jazeera repeated that some of the victims’ families claimed Iraqi forces had initially 
wounded them, but then detained and later killed them, thereby casting the army as 
predatory rather than defensive.
Amidst the Fallujah campaign, Al-Mayadeen featured a number of interviews with Iraqi 
military and PMF leaders including Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (head of the PMF), Jaaffar 
al-Husseini (spokesperson for Kata’ib Hezbollah) and Hadi al-Ameri (head of the Badr 
Brigade) who all affirmed their high ethical standards, support for the Iraqi army and 
cooperation with local (Sunni) tribes for the good of the civilian population. Only one 
Al-Mayadeen result acknowledged the possibility that certain PMF were indeed guilty of 
human rights violations: an episode of the weekly ‘Countdown’, in which the presenter 
suggested to one of her guests that such crimes may have occurred. And, in an apparent 
bid to undercut criticisms of the PMF by Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, Al-Mayadeen posted 
an opinion piece attacking the ‘defamation battle launched by the international Arab axis 
supporting Takfiri terrorism’.43
By contrast, while neither Al-Arabiya nor Al-Jazeera endorsed Daesh’s oppressive rule of 
Fallujah, both emphasised that civilians’ plight was equally due to the Iraqi forces’ siege 
on the city and ‘indiscriminate’ shelling of residential areas.44 They refer to the ‘liberation’ 
of Fallujah in inverted commas, thereby questioning the validity of the description.45 And 
they report repeatedly on allegations and evidence of human rights abuses by PMF and 
other Iraqi armed forces.46 Al-Arabiya shows ‘leaked’ photos of PMF leaders, including 
42 See, for example: http://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2013/4/23/ةجيوحلاب-نيجتحم-عم-تاكابتشاب-ىلتق; 
in one picture posted on the Al-Jazeera website, mobile footage of Hawija shows protestors 
leaving the square with a stretcher in tow. The caption reads ‘almost a hundred killed and 
200 injured in army raid on protest in Hawija and the aftermath of the raid’. Available at: 
http://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2013/4/25/ةجيوحلل-اماقتنا-فنعلا-دعاصتب-ىلتقلا-تارشع
43  Ayad Harfush, ‘Fallujah: the liberation battle and the defamation battle’. Available at: 
http://www.almayadeen.net/articles/blog/809608/حيرجتلا-ةكرعمو-ريرحتلا-ةكرعم--ةجولفلا
44  See, for example: https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/iraq/2016/06/01/نميلا.html; and: 
http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/alarabiya-today/2016/06/02/-يلودلا-تمصلاو-دشحلاو-شعاد-ةيحض-ةجولفلا.html
45   See, for example: https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2016/5/29/نيموي-للاخ-ةجولفلا-لخديس-شيجلا-يدابعلا
46   See, for example: https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2016/6/3/ةجولفلا-كراعم-نم-رفت-ةيقارعلا-تلائاعلا-تائم
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Badr Brigade leader Hadi al-Ameri, wearing federal police uniforms.47 Al-Jazeera reported 
that the PMF describe the people of Fallujah as ‘a well of terrorism and a cancerous tumour 
that must be eradicated’, who have abused citizens for the sole sin of ‘being Sunni’, and 
featured interviews with civilians who had escaped Fallujah and claimed mistreatment at 
PMF hands.48
Al-Arabiya coverage of Fallujah focused on alleged Iranian sectarian imperialism. ‘Irani-
an-funded militias’, as the channel referred collectively to the PMF, were the main tools. 
This impression is built through quotes from prominent Sunni voices including Iraq’s 
Grand Mufti, who warns that Fallujah comprises a sectarian revenge operation by Iranian 
militias;49 and multiple opinion articles about ‘hateful sectarian militias’50 which note that 
‘the Shiʿa militias are pursuing ethnic cleansing’; ‘the first target in the war on terrorism 
is the Sunnis’51 and ‘the Sunni Arab community [in Iraq and Syria] is being subjected to a 
major massacre.’52 A piece by Al-Arabiya’s former director general claims that ‘extremist 
Shiʿa came to take part in the operations of sectarian incitement, along with the Iranian 
General Soleimani who made the siege of Fallujah a symbol for the exploits of the Revo-
lutionary Guard…’.53
Al-Arabiya was similarly critical of Iran’s role in the four towns agreement and repeatedly 
reported on forced evacuations producing a new sectarian-based map in Syria. Al-Ja-
zeera sidelined the agreement’s potential humanitarian transgressions – presumably due 
to Qatar’s role in brokering it. All channels emphasised condemnation of the ‘terrorist’ 
suicide bombing in Rashidin in 2017. Al-Mayadeen’s reporting took for granted that an 
opposition faction was responsible. In an episode of ‘Alif Lam Mim’, presenter Abu Yahia 
Zakaria condemned ‘the new Jahiliyyin [‘Jahiliyya’ is the age of ignorance before Islam], 
their Takfiri jurisprudence and their culture of genocide’, for a series of massacres includ-
ing those connected to Karada and Speicher in Iraq, and Foʿa and Kefraya [i.e. Rashidin] in 
Syria.54 Meanwhile, Al-Jazeera reporters stressed that the perpetrators had not been identi-
fied and featured an interview with an opposition forces coordinator who maintained that 
the regime was capable of perpetrating such an attack to distract international attention 
from its recent use of chemical weapons in Khan Sheikhoun.55
47   ‘Leaked Photos from Iraq: popular militia leaders in police clothes’. Available at: https://www.alarabiya.
net/ar/arab-and-world/iraq/2016/06/02/ةطرشلا-يزب-يبعشلا-دشحلاب-تادايق-قارعلا-نم-ةبرسم-روص.html
48   See: https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2016/5/27/ةقرلاو-ةجولفلا-يتكرعمب-ةيفئاطلا-ريذاحم-كردن-اكريمأ and 
https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2016/5/30/دشحلا-تاكاهتنا-نم-نوكتشي-ةجولفلا-وحزان
49  See video report:  
https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/iraq/2016/05/31/ةجولفلا-يف-ءادهشلا-يح-فراشم-ىلع-ةيقارعلا-تاوقلا
50   Mishari al-Dhaydi, ‘After Fallujah?’ Available at:  
https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/politics/2016/06/01/ةجولفلا-دعب-ام.html
51   Mutlaq al-Mtairi, ‘Will Iran send Daesh to perform the Haj?’ Available at:  
https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/saudi-today/2016/06/04/؟جحلل-شعاود-ناريإ-لسرتس-له.html
52   Hazem Saghieh, ‘The Humiliation of the Sunni Arabs’. Available at:  
https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/politics/2016/06/04/ةيبرعلا-ةينسلا-للاذإ-.html
53   ‘Abdulrahman al-Rashed, ‘They’re all in Fallujah’. Available at:  
https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/politics/2016/06/03/ةجولفلا-يف-مهعيمج.html
54   ‘Alif Lam Mim’. Available at: http://www.almayadeen.net/episodes/743677/دوهعلا-ثكنو-ةدابلإا-هقف
55   ‘Al-Rashidin Explosion in Aleppo: Search for the Beneficiaries’. Available at:  
https://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2017/4/17/ديفتسملا-نع-شتف-بلحب-نيدشارلا-ريجفت
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That selective coverage has a powerful bearing on the impression created is clearly 
demonstrated in the reporting on Hatla. Overall, none of the channels reported much 
on the event. As with much of the violence in the Syrian war, journalists’ access to the 
area was clearly restricted and details are difficult to ascertain. Al-Mayadeen reported that 
Syrian opposition websites had posted a video of armed opposition elements celebrating 
and boasting after storming Hatla and killing a number of people, including women and 
children. Days later Al-Mayadeen noted that Al-Qa’eda fighters had destroyed a Husseiniya 
(a Shiʿa holy gathering place) in Hatla and killed 60 people on a sectarian basis, pointedly 
bracketing this detail with the news that Saudi Arabia had decided to arm the opposition 
with surface-to-air missiles.56
The only result retrieved for Al-Arabiya on Hatla was an article that cited the Syrian 
Foreign Ministry noting that the US administration’s ‘support to terrorist groups in Syria… 
prevent(s) the Security Council from condemning the massacres they have committed, 
including most recently the Hatla massacre in Deir al-Zour province committed by Jabhat 
al-Nusra which claimed the lives of more than 60 people, mostly women and children.’57 
The reference was, however, sandwiched amidst an article principally about the UN and 
the EU demanding an investigation into the Syrian government’s alleged use of chemical 
weapons.
Al-Jazeera Arabic’s framing of Hatla was particularly conspicuous because of what it omitted. 
Both Al-Jazeera Arabic and Al-Jazeera English posted articles mentioning the incident on 12 
June 2013, relying predominantly on information released by the Syrian Observatory for 
Human Rights, a UK-based organisation with a network of volunteers across Syria which 
has reported rights violations since the start of the conflict. However, the way in which 
the channels imparted the same information differed starkly. The Al-Jazeera English article 
was entitled ‘Reports of “massacre” in Eastern Syria’. The article quoted a Syrian official 
claiming it had been a massacre of civilians; mentioned the video of the masked militants 
celebrating killing the ‘rejectionists’ (Shiʿa), and noted that:
The reported killings highlight the sectarian nature of Syria’s conflict that has killed 
more than 94,000 people, according to the UN. Both sides in the fighting have been 
accused of abuses, with the UN saying that war crimes are a “daily reality” in Syria.58
Meanwhile, the Arabic version incorporated only a few sentences on Hatla into an article 
entitled ‘Tens killed in Deir Al-Zour’ about rebel forces’ military advances in the region.59 
The article stated that according to the Observatory, ‘most of those killed were militants 
loyal to the Syrian regime’, making no reference to civilians or to the video released.
56   ‘Syrian Army Strikes Militant Positions near Damascus and Al-Qaeda fighters Destroy Hussainiya’. 
Available at: http://www.almayadeen.net/news/584764/
57   ‘Ban Ki-Moon and Europe demand UN investigation into Syrian Chemical Industry’. Available at: 
https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/syria/2013/06/14/ةيواميكلا-ةحلسلأا-مادختسا-نأشب-بذكلاب-اكيرمأ-مهتت-ايروس.html
58   ‘Reports of “massacre” in Eastern Syria’. Available at:  
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/06/201361294148169694.html
59   ‘Tens Killed in Deir Al-Zour and Aleppo’.  
Available at: https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2013/6/12/بلحو-روزلا-ريدب-ىلتقلا-تارشع
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Conclusions
Post-2010, Al-Jazeera Arabic has borne the brunt of official accusations for promoting the 
causes of Sunni militant groups, including those who incite anti-Shiʿa sectarian violence. 
The qualitative analysis conducted for this report, whilst scarcely statistically signifi-
cant, suggests that Al-Jazeera and Al-Mayadeen both give more airtime than Al-Arabiya to 
a range of non-state groups who publicly advocate violence (Al-Jazeera predominantly 
to Sunni militant groups, Al-Mayadeen predominantly to Shiʿa militant groups). Within 
the parameters of the analysis, however, none of the channels explicitly used sect on air 
as a justification for violence. Neither was any evidence found of them giving platforms 
to groups espousing sectarian hate speech on air against Shiʿa or Sunnis respectively, 
although all channels regularly featured voices who accused their opponents of sectarian 
violence.
The results studied demonstrated the significance of diverging editorial lines amongst the 
channels: Al-Jazeera was more ‘liberal’ in its interview policy than the other two channels. 
But, while this meant that it was more likely to show dissenting views in both countries, it 
also meant that it was more likely to interview or directly quote individuals who espoused 
extremist views. Al-Arabiya was more controlled in who it gave a voice to, tending to rely 
more on official sources. But ultimately, while Saudi Arabia and Qatar pursued different 
politics and back different groups, both Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya have allowed powerful 
narratives to emerge that collectively cast Sunnis as victims. Al-Mayadeen on the other 
hand, in keeping with Iran and Hezbollah, emphasised the view that Sunnis as well as 
Shiʿa and Christians were victims of the Takfiriyyin.
Following this observation, the principle finding from the case studies is that in a main-
stream context, discussion of sectarian violence is politically grounded in competing 
claims to legitimacy.  What is meant by ‘inciting sectarian violence,’ rarely refers to man-
ifestly abusive hate speech or to condoning human rights atrocities (such as the Speicher 
massacre perpetrated by Daesh), but to presenting a worldview that justifies the need for 
violence by a particular sect – even when sect is in fact peripheral to the ‘real’ cause for 
violence. Most frequently, the justification is grounded in a narrative of victimhood.
The conflicts in Iraq and Syria have never been purely about sect: much of the violence 
perpetrated has been within same sect groups, and sympathetic coverage of militant 
groups is not determined by sect alone. By the same token, there is no shortage of evi-
dence that horrific crimes have been perpetrated against all sects in both countries, often 
on a manifestly sectarian basis. But by deliberately accentuating, downplaying, or ignor-
ing particular details and views related to these crimes, all of the channels surveyed can 
be considered guilty of inciting sectarian violence, if only through deliberate negligence. 
The best way to consolidate this contention would be to measure audience reactions to 
framing devices applied to the reporting of sectarian violence. Doing so would require 
extensive surveys and qualitative focus groups, or on a smaller scale, monitoring public 
comments added to news reports on websites (although these are generally moderated). 
These tasks fall outside the remit of the current report. Even so, several policy relevant 
suggestions emerge from the report.
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Donors have invested into media content analysis in order to detect hate speech. If, 
however, as this study suggests, incitement to sectarian violence in the mainstream is 
contextually evoked, and justifying violence is an ongoing project related to the overall 
framing of events, it will not be readily detected by automated analysis of isolated tropes 
or keywords. Data analysis tools, to be useful in monitoring large volumes of media, need 
to be able to synthesise multiple search criteria and, moreover, detect what pertinent 
information is omitted.
On the other hand, to counter unbalanced reporting, donors have also explored avenues 
for promoting ‘peace journalism’ in post-conflict societies. This has included training 
journalists on ethical professionalism and encouraging them to avoid certain (contex-
tually determined and in other senses benign) words or phrases that have the effect of 
promoting violence. Such exercises are valuable in that they can guide journalists to avoid 
‘sectarianising’ issues by noting individuals’ sect in conflict situations where it is not nec-
essarily relevant. But this can only be effective where journalists are receptive to such 
training. As a Lebanese media training professional indicated in an interview, the principle 
problem with established media outlets is not lack of journalistic aptitude, but political 
affiliation.
Al-Jazeera is instructive in this respect: the organisation has its own training centre which 
delivers courses on ethical professionalism. Furthermore, Al-Jazeera’s editorial guidelines 
provide detailed instruction on how to avoid using charged, emotive language or exagger-
ating the importance of religion when reporting on conflict. Overall, Al-Jazeera journalists 
adhere to these guidelines. And yet, editorial bias creeps through all the same; primarily in 
the way details are accentuated or suppressed. Some journalists who left Al-Jazeera to join 
Al-Mayadeen due to perceived bias have subsequently found the editorial slant of the new 
channel to be equally skewed.60 This suggests that legal regulation of tightly defined hate 
speech would probably not counter incitement in the mainstream media, whilst prohibi-
tions on more loosely defined ‘dangerous speech’ would likely be used to further suppress 
free speech.
Political partisanship is scarcely unique to the Middle East. Nonetheless, the level of 
regional insecurity – coupled with the multi-national viewership of Arab satellite news 
channels – renders the effect of media outlets’ political biases far more potent than else-
where. Faced with this prognosis, the need for Arab media platforms with international 
reach whose funding is not bound to political elites is greater than ever. With the explo-
sion of digital platforms across the region, and the diversification of audience viewership, 
start-up media ventures have proliferated over the past decade. Their main stumbling 
block thus far has been finding ways to become commercially viable without relying on 
political patronage or indeed on international development aid which is often closely 
associated with Western geopolitical agendas. Creative financing initiatives for emerging 
independent media ventures are vital areas for future research.
60   Author interview with former Al-Mayadeen journalist, Beirut, September 2018. 
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